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Abstract
Reciprocal customers may disproportionately improve the per-
formance of markets for experience goods. Reciprocal customers re-
ward (punish) ￿rms for providing good (bad) quality by upholding
(terminating) the customer relation. This may induce ￿rms to provide
good quality which, in turn, may induce a positive externality for non-
reciprocal customers who would, in the absence of reciprocal types,
face market breakdown. This e¢ ciency-enhancing e⁄ect of reciprocity
is boosted when there are social ties between consumers and compet-
ition between ￿rms. The existence of social ties or competition alone
does not improve market performance.
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11 Introduction
Market failure may loom large in markets for experience goods. The quality
of an experience good is known to consumers only after the good is bought
and consumed (Nelson 1970). Consequently, if providing good quality is
costly and if interactions are anonymous, ￿rms have incentives to provide
poor quality and consumers are reluctant to buy. Sometimes such market
failure can be mitigated by measures taken by individual ￿rms or govern-
ments. Examples include money-back guarantees and various forms of sig-
nalling (Leibenstein 1987, see Riley 2001 for a survey). If such measures
are not feasible, long-term customer relations may provide a remedy against
market failure in non-anonymous markets, as has already been argued by
Akerlof (1970) and Arrow (1973). In this paper we investigate in a simple
framework how reciprocity can provide a remedy against market failure￿
in particular, if consumers have social ties with each other which permit
information exchange.
Reciprocity can induce long-term customer relations in non-anonymous
markets because reciprocal customers ￿reward￿￿rms who have provided good
quality in the past by upholding the customer relation, and ￿punish￿￿rms
who have provided poor quality by terminating the customer relation. When
confronted with a reciprocal customer, a pro￿t-maximising ￿rm trades o⁄
the one-time gain from providing bad quality against the loss from losing
the customer. If the ￿rm can keep the customer for a su¢ ciently long time
by providing high quality, it is pro￿table to provide good quality. This dir-
ect e⁄ect of reciprocity on market performance is intuitive and empirically
supported (Renner and Tyran 2004). In our approach this direct e⁄ect of
reciprocity plays some role but it is supported by an indirect or social mul-
tiplier e⁄ect1 of reciprocity. To the best of our knowledge, these have not
1Social multiplier e⁄ects result from positive externalities generating strategic comple-
mentarity between agents. That is, with social multiplier e⁄ects, the propensity of one
person to perform a particular act is positively a⁄ected by his neighbours￿propensity to
do so. The existence of social multiplier e⁄ects implies that individual-level character-
2been studied in the literature so far.
We demonstrate two e⁄ects of how reciprocal customers improve e¢ ciency
in markets for experience goods. The ￿rst e⁄ect results from a positive ex-
ternality that reciprocal customers generate in the market by providing in-
centives for fully self-interested, non-reciprocal customers (who would choose
to leave the market if left on their own) to enter the market also. Reciprocal
customers ￿crowd-in￿ non-reciprocal customers. The second e⁄ect results
from competition between ￿rms and social ties among customers. We show
that if reciprocal customers have social relations among each other, compet-
ing ￿rms have an additional incentive to provide good quality because doing
so may attract reciprocal customers from competing ￿rms. This, in turn,
provides additional incentives for non-reciprocal customers to enter the mar-
ket. In other words, social ties tend to crowd-in reciprocal customers from
competing ￿rms which, in turn, tends to crowd-in non-reciprocal customers.
We show that the existence of reciprocal customers is key to this result since
social ties per se￿ in the absence of reciprocal customers￿ do not improve
market performance. Nor does competition per se.
To demonstrate these e⁄ects in the most parsimonious way, we use a ￿-
nitely repeated trust game (see James 2002 for a survey) as the basic building
block of our model. Our model is ￿behavioural￿ in that it integrates in-
sights from experimental economics into a standard game-theoretic analysis.
We model agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their motivations
(Camerer 2003). In particular, we model three types of customers: sophist-
icated types who are perfectly self-interested and forward-looking, reciprocal
types who make their shopping decisions contingent on past ￿rm behaviour,
and loyal types who buy from one ￿rm regardless of their experience. The
focus of our model is on the (indirect) e⁄ects of reciprocal customers be-
cause mounting evidence from experimental studies suggests that reciprocity
istics can have a disproportionately strong e⁄ect on aggregate outcomes (see Becker and
Murphy 2000). Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) show that social multiplier
e⁄ects exist for example in the context of demographics and crime or among Dartmouth
college roommates.
3is a basic and common motivational drive (see Fehr and G￿chter 2000 for a
survey).
We proceed as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the literature. Sec-
tion 3 explains the basic ingredients of our modelling approach. Section 3.1
discusses monopoly as a benchmark case. We show that with an incentive
structure in which market performance is low if all customers are sophist-
icated, market performance disproportionately improves with the share of
reciprocal customers in the population, while market performance falls un-
der some conditions with the share of loyal customers. In Section 3.2 we
assume that ￿rms compete, but that customers have no social ties among
each other. We show that competition in the absence of social ties does not
su¢ ce to improve market performance. The intuition for this result is that in
the absence of social ties customers do not systematically switch to ￿rms hav-
ing provided good quality in the past, and ￿rms therefore have no additional
incentive to provide good quality. In Section 3.3, we analyse competition
between ￿rms when customers are embedded in social networks of varying
density. We show that reciprocal customers have stronger social multiplier
e⁄ects if ￿rms compete and customers are embedded in more dense networks.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Reciprocity, reputation and social ties in
markets for experience goods
Reciprocally motivated customers tend to ￿reward￿￿rms for good perform-
ance by upholding the customer relation, and to ￿punish￿the ￿rm by ter-
minating the customer relation. That is, a reciprocal customer is a repeat
customer as long as he is provided with the desired quality. If the prospects
for future interaction look good, a ￿rm may ￿nd it pro￿table to provide
good quality, which induces the reciprocal customer to stay with ￿his￿￿rm.
As a consequence, reciprocity directly improves the e¢ ciency in markets for
experience goods and induces long-term customer relations.
4Long-term relations between buyers and sellers are very common in goods
markets. For example, Blinder et al. (1998: 302) ￿nd that ￿about 85 percent
of all the goods and services in the U.S. nonfarm business sector are sold to
￿ regular customers￿with whom sellers have an ongoing relationship￿ . How-
ever, this remarkable prevalence of long-term customer relations can be due
to various factors (e.g., search or switching costs). The reason why we refer to
reciprocity rather than to these alternative explanations is that reciprocity
is a widespread motivational drive and that reciprocity-induced long-term
relations may be relevant independently of, and therefore add to, the other
explanations.
Empirical support for the direct e⁄ects of reciprocity comes from studies
using a wide array of methods. Renner and Tyran (2004) study an exper-
imental market for experience goods in which customers can choose to be
repeat customers of a particular seller or to buy from an anonymous mar-
ket. They show that both buyers and sellers prefer to repeatedly trade in a
bilateral relation rather than use the anonymous market, and that the res-
ulting repeat relations are more e¢ cient than the anonymous market. They
also ￿nd that buyers tend to punish sellers for providing bad quality by ter-
minating the relation. Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) ￿nd similar results in a
labour market experiment in which quality uncertainty problems prevail. Be-
wley (1999) provides complementary support for the notion that reciprocity
importantly shapes labour markets in a comprehensive questionnaire study.
Field evidence on goods markets comes from Weisbuch, Kirman and Her-
reiner (2000). They observe that most buyers in the Marseille ￿sh market
repeatedly buy from the same merchant, and show that this behaviour can
be explained by assuming that buyers increase the probability of shopping
at a particular store if previous experience was favourable. Finally, man-
agement research suggests that customers tend to return to the same ￿rm if
they perceive to be treated fairly, but tend to shun a ￿rm if they were treated
unfairly (Forrester and Mante 2001, Ganesa 1994).
How do these direct e⁄ects of reciprocity relate to reputation? In non-
5anonymous markets, customers can identify ￿rms and choose whom to buy
from. By repeatedly buying from the same ￿rm, customers become repeat
customers of a particular ￿rm. By de￿nition, a repeat customer knows
how ￿his￿￿rm performed in the past. Therefore, repeat interaction in non-
anonymous markets allows a ￿rm to establish a ￿reputation￿as a high-quality
provider among existing customers. We refer to this type of reputation form-
ation as direct reputation formation.
In standard models of direct reputation formation (e.g., Kreps et al.
1982), ￿rms can establish a reputation because consumers face some uncer-
tainty about the type of the ￿rm. If, for example, consumers think that there
are some ￿nice￿￿rms that always o⁄er good quality (despite the economic
incentives not to), then a perfectly rational ￿rm may imitate the behaviour
of a nice ￿rm to ￿alter￿the consumer￿ s beliefs. The more often a consumer
observes good quality, the higher his posterior belief to be actually confronted
with a nice ￿rm. In ￿nitely repeated games of this type, rational ￿rms will
eventually exploit their stock of repeat customers. Our approach may look
similar to these standard reputation models but this semblance is deceptive.
In our approach, all ￿rms are perfectly rational pro￿t maximisers. There are
no ￿nice￿￿rms and, accordingly, pro￿t-maximising ￿rms cannot manipulate
consumers￿beliefs. However, there are di⁄erent types of consumers￿ some
are reciprocal, some are not￿ and we will show that the presence of the
reciprocal types can create incentives for ￿rms to deliver good quality.2
For reasons of tractability, our analysis remains relatively simple with re-
spect to the modeling of social ties. For example, we do not study how social
networks are formed in response to market failure in markets for experience
goods (Kranton and Minehart 2001) or how the details of the social network
structure a⁄ect economic interaction (for such an analysis, see Buskens 1998).
Rather, we assume all customers to be equally well-embedded in the social
2An early contribution showing that di⁄erent ￿types￿ of buyers may change market
outcomes is due to von Ungern-Sternberg and von Weizs￿cker (1985). In contrast to these
authors, we use a game-theoretic framework and analyse the e⁄ects of social ties.
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Figure 1: The market game (a;b > 0)
network. A further simpli￿cation is that ￿rms are assumed to choose the
quality of their product, but not the price. Extending the analysis to ￿rms￿
pricing decisions may be quite fruitful because reciprocity may generate price
rigidity (see Rotemberg 2002, Renner and Tyran 2004).
3 Model
The simple trust game shown in Figure 1 captures the key characteristic of
markets for experience goods. The customer can either buy a unit of the good
with unknown quality (move B) or stay out of the market (move O). The
￿rm can either provide poor quality (move P) or good quality (move G). The
￿rm has a temptation to cheat by providing poor quality since 1+b > 1. The
customer would, of course, prefer good quality over poor quality (1 > ￿a).
In fact, poor quality is assumed to be so poor that the customer prefers not
buying at all over receiving a poor-quality product (￿a < 0).
Suppose that both players are rational and egoistic, and suppose further
that the game is played only once. A rational customer anticipates that a
rational pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm will provide poor quality. Therefore, such a
customer will not buy (0 > ￿a), and the only Nash equilibrium outcome is
7complete market breakdown. Note that the prediction of market breakdown
is as in Akerlof (1970), but is due to moral hazard in our model, and not to
adverse selection. The prediction of market breakdown also prevails in this
game if the game is repeated for any ￿nite number of periods. If the game
is extended such that there are many customers or many competing ￿rms
the same ine¢ cient outcome results. Various mechanisms to mitigate this
ine¢ ciency have been discussed in the literature (e.g., branding, commitment
strategies, advertisements, see Leibenstein 1987). In the following, we assume
that these measures are not feasible which allows us to study the social
multiplier e⁄ect of reciprocity in isolation.
We distinguish three types of consumers ￿ sophisticated types (S), recip-
rocal types (R) and loyal types (L). The sophisticated consumers correspond
to the standard assumptions of economics. They are fully rational and are
able to perfectly predict the behaviour of all other agents. They simply max-
imise expected payo⁄. As a consequence, they shop if and only if a ￿rm
provides good quality with a su¢ ciently high probability. Reciprocal types
are assumed to condition their decisions on experience. In particular, they
are reciprocal in that they give it a try, and continue to buy from a ￿rm if
it has a clean past, i.e., if it always delivered good quality. Hence, reciprocal
consumers become repeat customers if a ￿rm provides good quality. How-
ever, they terminate the customer relation once a ￿rm provides poor quality.
Finally, loyal consumers are assumed to buy from one and the same ￿rm
regardless of experience or expectations. There are two possible reasons for
why a consumer might be loyal in that sense. Firstly, he could￿ falsely￿
always expect good quality. Secondly, and more importantly, he might have
an outside option that is even worse, i.e., he might need the product even
if it has poor quality (perhaps because he needs it for medical reasons or is
addicted to it).
Without loss of generality, we normalise the mass of consumers to 1. The
share of sophisticated types is denoted by s, the share of reciprocal types by
r, and the share of loyal types by l. Of course, s + r + l = 1.
8Our analysis focuses on how reciprocals shape markets for experience
goods. Market performance is measured as the volume of good quality goods
traded. For the sake of simplicity, we do not analyse pricing decisions ex-
plicitly (see Renner and Tyran 2003). We restrict our analysis here to two-
period markets and assume a common discount factor 0 > ￿ > 1. This
simpli￿es our presentation as far as possible while still retaining the full stra-
tegic structure of the problem.
3.1 Monopoly
In this section we assume that there is only one ￿rm, and that customers
have no social ties among each other and, thus, cannot share their exper-
ience otherwise. However, the market is non-anonymous in the sense that
consumers know (and remember) the quality provided by the single ￿rm. We
assume that all customers make their shopping decisions simultaneously and
independently. Moreover, we assume that the game described in Section 3
is played twice. The two-period case is conveniently simple but contains all
qualitative features of the general ￿nitely repeated game with T periods (to
which our analysis can be easily extended).
We solve the two-period game by simple backward induction.
2nd period, 2nd stage The monopolist chooses to deliver poor quality
(move P) regardless of how many consumers decided to buy his product
and regardless of the composition of the consumers who made this de-
cision.
2nd period, 1st stage By de￿nition, loyal types (L) decide to buy (move
B) from the monopolist.
Sophisticated types (S) anticipate the monopolist￿ s defection in the 2nd
stage and choose their outside option (move O).
The behavior of reciprocal types (R) is contingent on the ￿rm￿ s past
performance. If the monopolist has delivered poor quality in the ￿rst
9period, reciprocal types punish the ￿rm by terminating the relation,
i.e., by choosing their outside option. If the ￿rm has delivered good
quality, reciprocal customers uphold the relation and buy again.
1st period, 2nd stage Clearly, the monopolist￿ s decision will depend on
the number and types of consumers who have decided to buy in the
1st period, 1st stage. By assumption reciprocal and loyal types always
decide to buy in the ￿rst period. Thus, the monopolist faces r+l recip-
rocal and loyal consumers and maybe also a fraction of sophisticated
customers which we denote by k (￿ s). Anticipating the future, the
monopolist can calculate the payo⁄s associated with good and poor
quality as follows. Delivering good quality gives him k + r + l in this
period and (1+b)(r +l) in the next period. In case of poor quality he
will earn (1 + b)(k + r + l) this period and l(1 + b) next period. Thus,
he will decide to deliver good quality if and only if
k + r + l + ￿(1 + b)(r + l) ￿ (1 + b)(k + r + l) + ￿l(1 + b)









1st period, 1st stage By assumption reciprocal and loyal consumers give
it a try without any further considerations. Not so, of course, sophist-
icated customers who anticipate the future and thus condition (1). As
















sophisticated consumers decide to buy. Therefore, k￿MON is the max-
imum number of sophisticated customers that can enter the market
such that the monopolist ￿nds it still pro￿table to provide good qual-
ity. In words, the max- and min-operators simply state that k￿MON
must be at least 0, and can be at most s.
10Equation (2) reveals what we have discussed earlier: Without reciprocal
or loyal customers (r = l = 0) the market breaks down completely, i.e.,
k￿MON = 0.
The main result of our analysis is that reciprocal types have a dispropor-
tionate e⁄ect on market outcomes. We ￿nd that, provided ￿rms are not too
impatient (￿ is not too small), and that the temptation to cheat is not too
large (b is not too large), reciprocal customers generate an externality in the
market, and crowd-in some k￿MON sophisticated customers. More precisely,
the share of sophisticated customers who buy in period 1 is weakly increasing
in r (@k￿MON=@r ￿ 0). Reciprocal customers directly increase e¢ ciency by
buying in the ￿rst period and, in addition, indirectly increase e¢ ciency by
crowding-in some sophisticated customers. Since k￿MON is a measure of mar-
ket e¢ ciency, reciprocal customers increase e¢ ciency in customer markets.
If there are too many loyal customers [l > r(￿ 1+b
b ￿ 1)], the monopolist
has always an incentive to deliver poor quality which induces sophisticated
customers to stay out of the market. In case of 0 < k￿MON < s; changes
in l do not a⁄ect market performance in the ￿rst period. The reason is
that for each additional loyal buyer a sophisticated buyer is crowded out
(@k￿MON=@l = ￿1). The intuition for this result is that since loyal custom-
ers return even upon having been cheated there is no sanction for the ￿rm
cheating on them. Note also that the presence of loyal customers may anni-
hilate the e¢ ciency-enhancing e⁄ect of reciprocal customers. As can be seen
from (2), if l is su¢ ciently large, k￿MON = 0, and an increase of the share of
reciprocal types has no e⁄ect in this case.
Finally, it does not come as a surprise that k￿MON is (weakly) increasing
in ￿ and decreasing in b. The higher the ￿rm values the future, the smaller
are the incentives to defect today. And the higher the gains from delivering
poor quality, the bigger are the incentives to do so.
To summarise: While reciprocal types crowd-in sophisticated custom-
ers, loyal types tend to crowd them out. However, reciprocal customers in
most cases disproportionately improve the e¢ ciency of the market for exper-
11ience goods. The reason is that the ￿rm knows that antagonising reciprocal
customers is costly, and is therefore hesitant to cheat. The sophisticated
customers know this and can free-ride on the reciprocal types￿willingness to
punish the ￿rm by terminating the relation.
In this section we have disregarded social ties among customers to be
able to focus on the direct e⁄ect of reciprocity. But, of course, social ties
cannot have an e⁄ect in the setting we studied. The reason is that social ties
serve to transmit information about quality in the market. However, such
transmission is worthless since all customers share the same experience in
monopoly.
3.2 Competition without social ties among customers
In this section we analyse how competition between ￿rms a⁄ects e¢ ciency in
markets with quality uncertainty as explained at the beginning of Section 3.
One might suspect that competition will eliminate or at least mitigate the
problem. However, our main result in this section is going to be that￿ for
most plausible cases￿ competition on its own does not improve market per-
formance. We shall only analyse the simplest form of competition, namely
the duopoly case with two identical ￿rms. Generalisations are straightfor-
ward.
If there are two ￿rms we must, of course, rede￿ne the decision rules of
reciprocal customers. Loyal customers are modelled as before, they stick to
one ￿rm regardless of what happens in the market. Reciprocal customers
stick also to the ￿rm they have bought from ￿rst provided that it has de-
livered good quality. What di⁄ers from the monopoly case is how reciprocal
customers act once their ￿rm has disappointed them. Reciprocal custom-
ers still punish their ￿rm by terminating the customer relation. Since we
assume in this section that customers are anonymous to each other, they
cannot learn from each other, but will only know their particular shopping
history. In particular, they will not know which quality the other ￿rm (from
which they didn￿ t buy) has delivered. Thus, within our framework two rules
12for reciprocal customers could apply. They could never buy again after hav-
ing been sold poor quality or they could switch to another ￿rm (or, in fact,
do this with some probability and drop out of the market with the remaining
probability.)
It turns out that in the two-period model the ￿rst-period equilibrium
solution is independent from the reciprocal customers￿decision rule and it is
easy to see why. Take the reciprocal customers who bought from ￿rm 1 and
got poor quality. The only di⁄erence between the two rules is in how these
customers a⁄ect the total numbers of customers who go shopping at ￿rm 2
in the second period. In this period, however, both ￿rms deliver poor quality
anyway. Moreover, ￿rm 2 cannot in￿ uence the decision of customers who
bought in the ￿rst period from ￿rm 1 as its quality is, due to anonymity,
unobservable. Hence, if reciprocal customers try out a di⁄erent ￿rm after
being disappointed, this will simply induce a windfall pro￿t for the other
￿rm but it will not be of any strategic signi￿cance.
Having made this observation, it is also straightforward to solve the rest
of the game. Without social ties among customers, the duopoly game is
more or less a composite of two monopoly games. In essence, there is no
real competition between the two ￿rms as they can￿ t communicate how good
they are to customers who have not chosen to buy from them. Thus, the
incentives of a ￿rm to provide good quality in period 1 depends in the same
way on the number of customers as in equation (1). And the behaviour of
sophisticated customers is again a simple function of the number of reciprocal
and loyal customers of the two ￿rms, similar to equation (2).
Let ri, li, and ki denote the shares of reciprocal, loyal and sophisticated
customers who buy in period 1 from ￿rm i (and let r, l, and s be the total










The shares of sophisticated customers who will go shopping at ￿rm i in
13the ￿rst period, k￿
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Notice that the equilibrium might be asymmetric in the sense of k￿DUO
i 6=
k￿DUO
j even if reciprocal and loyal customers are equally distributed among
the two ￿rms, i.e., if ri = r=2 and li = l=2. This case can arise when the






This, however, is the case when all sophisticated customers buy in the ￿rst
period. On the other hand, if ri = r=2 and li = l=2, all solutions that






=2 ￿ l=2.3 Thus, in the case









and hence the same e¢ ciency as in the monopoly case.
If reciprocal and loyal customers are not equally distributed, the welfare
e⁄ects of competition are ambiguous. Welfare may increase but may also
become smaller. To illustrate the latter case, simply assume that the para-
meters and shares of reciprocal and loyal customers are such that k￿MON > 0





such that (3) does
not hold for this ￿rm. Then no sophisticated customer will buy from this
￿rm. Moreover, the total number of rational customers buying from both





￿ l1 ￿ l2 and, hence, smaller
than k￿MON. The intuition for this case is simple. If one ￿rm has a dis-
proportionate number of loyal customers it may have incentives to deliver
poor quality even if no sophisticated customers show up. In that case the
3Suppose this were not true, i.e., suppose one ￿rm would have less customers. (Clearly,





=2￿l=2 since this would provide an incentive
to deliver poor quality what would be anticipated by the sophisticated customers.) Then
some of the sophisticated customers who do not buy from either of the ￿rms could prof-
itably deviate by buying from the ￿rm with less customers (without giving this ￿rm an
incentive to deliver poor quality).
14reciprocal customers of ￿rm j (who, in general, increase e¢ ciency by making
it attractive for rational customers to join them) are ￿wasted￿on this ￿rm.
On the other hand, suppose that the parameters are such that 1 >
k￿MON > 0, ri = r for one ￿rm and lj > 0 for the other ￿rm. In that
case the loyal customers of ￿rm j (who, in general, reduce e¢ ciency) do not
do any harm. No rational customer buys from this ￿rm anyway. Were some
of these loyal types redistributed to ￿rm i they would, of course, reduce the
number of sophisticated customers buying from i (as they would reduce the
number of sophisticated customers buying from a monopolist).
So we ￿nd that only rather ￿extreme￿ distributions of reciprocal and
loyal customers can induce welfare changes when we compare competition
without social ties among customers with the monopoly case. We point this
out simply because accuracy demands it and not because we are considering
these e⁄ects as important. In the realm of our modelling approach, the
symmetric case seems the one which is justi￿ed best. In the absence of any
history (at the beginnging of each period) no customer, regardless of their
type, should have a particular reason to prefer either of the ￿rms. Thus,
for other than sophisticated customers the assumption that they ￿ ip a coin
seems appropriate. In the case of a continuum of customers this gives exactly
rise to the equal-distribution case. This analysis can easily be generalised to
the case with n > 2 ￿rms and T > 2 periods.
3.3 Competition with social ties among customers
In this subsection, we assume that customers have social ties among each
other. These social ties allow customers to learn from each other, for example
by word-of-mouth communication, about the quality chosen by both ￿rms.
From the discussion above, it should be clear that this implies that reciprocal
customers should be modelled di⁄erently. We will assume that they buy from
the same ￿rm again if it has delivered good quality and that they will switch
￿rms if the one they bought from delivered poor quality and they know about
another that delivered good quality. In all other cases they will not buy again
15and leave the market.
We assume that customers are embedded in social networks of density
d 2 [0;1]. This density determines whether a customers learns about the
quality of the other ￿rm. Hence, d can be interpreted as the percentage of
reciprocal customers who were disappointed from their ￿rm and now switch
to the ￿rm that has a clean past. We will show that the existence of social ties
a⁄ects market outcomes rather dramatically as the two ￿rms now compete for
reciprocal customers. In particular, a ￿rm will have an additional incentive
to provide good quality if it knows that the other ￿rm provides poor quality.
The reason is that the ￿rm can gain additional customers in this case, while
this had been impossible for, both, monopolists and duopolists in markets
without social ties. The dependence of one ￿rm￿ s optimal behaviour on its
belief about the other ￿rm￿ s actions causes multiplicity of equilibria with the
unique symmetric equilibrium being in mixed strategies.
For ease of notation we will focus on the case of equally distributed types
and parameters such that 1 > k￿MON > 0.
We solve the game by backward induction.
2nd period, 2nd stage Both ￿rms choose to deliver poor quality regard-
less of how many consumers decided to buy their products and regard-
less of the composition of the consumers they face.
2nd period, 1st stage By de￿nition, loyal types (L) decide to buy from
the same ￿rm as before.
Sophisticated types (S) anticipate the ￿rms￿defection in the second
stage and choose their outside options.
The behaviour of reciprocal types (R) is contingent on ￿rms￿past per-
formance In particular, the behaviour of reciprocal types depends on
the history of the ￿rms they have been shopping from in period 1 as
well as on the history of the other ￿rm, insofar as this history is known
to reciprocal customers. If both duopolists have delivered poor qual-
ity in the ￿rst period, they will choose their outside option; if both
16delivered good quality, they will buy from the ￿rm from which they
bought it the ￿rst period. If ￿rms￿qualities were di⁄erent, they buy
from the one with better quality.
1st period, 2nd stage Firms￿behaviour will depend on the number of cus-
tomers in their shops and on what they expect the other ￿rm to do. Let
us ￿rst suppose ￿rm i expects ￿rm j to deliver good quality. Then also
delivering good quality (and anticipating the future correctly) would
give a payo⁄of ki+ r+l
2 +￿(1+b)r+l
2 while the provision of poor quality
would yield (ki + r+l
2 )(1+b)+￿(1+b) l
2. Thus, delivering good quality













( = k) (4)
as in (3). Next, consider the case where ￿rm i expects that ￿rm j
will deliver poor quality. While delivering poor quality would yield the
same payo⁄ as above, there is now an extra incentive to deliver good
quality. In this case, ￿rm i can attract the reciprocal customers who
were disappointed from ￿rm j in the ￿rst period. Thus providing, good
quality would give a payo⁄ of ki + r+l
2 + ￿(1 + b)
r(1+d)+l
2 making good













( = k): (5)
Notice that the threshold value of sophisticated customers is higher
when ￿rm i expects ￿rm j to provide poor quality, i.e., k > k if d > 0:
This relation essentially captures the fact that the existence of social
ties provides additional incentives for ￿rms to provide good quality. For
given ki and kj, (4) and (5) essentially describe the ￿rms￿best-reply
correspondences from which it is straightforward to ￿nd the equilibria.
Table 1 shows which pure-strategy subgame equilibria arise. For ex-
ample, suppose that ki;kj < k < k: This may, for example, happen if s
is small relative to r. In this case, providing good quality is a dominant
17kj < k k ￿ kj ￿ k k < kj
ki < k (Gi;Gj) (Gi;Pj) (Gi;Pj)




k < ki (Pi;Gj) (Pi;Gj) (Pi;Pj)
Table 1: Pure-strategy equilibria in the quality-setting subgame played
among two ￿rms in the presence of social ties.
strategy for both ￿rms, and the pure strategy equilibrium is (Gi;Gj)
(see upper left cell of Table 1).
The analysis of this stage is completed by computing the mixed-
strategy subgame equilibrium that can arise when k ￿ ki;kj ￿ k.
Let pi the probability with which ￿rm i chooses good quality. Then
￿rm j must be indi⁄erent between the payo⁄it can assure by choosing






















+ ￿(1 + b)
r(1 + d) + l
2
￿








b(2kj + r + l)
￿r(1 + b)d
which is between 0 and 1 for k ￿ kj ￿ k .
1st period, 1st stage Inspecting Table 1 it is straightforward to see that
in equilibrium at least k and not more than k rational consumers will go
to either of the ￿rms. Moreover, it is easy to see that there is no equi-
librium where the two ￿rms play according to the asymmetric subgame
18equilibria identi￿ed above. (If they were to do so, no sophisticated cus-
tomer would come to the poor￿ quality ￿rm. And if no sophisticated
customer were to come to a ￿rm it would have an incentive to pro-
duce good quality.) Hence, customers will correctly anticipate that the
￿rms will mix over their actions in stage 2. As a consequence, soph-
isticated customers must compare the possible bene￿ts of good quality
and possible losses from buying poor quality. In equilibrium there will
be exactly so many sophisticated customers buying from ￿rm j such
that they earn in expectation exactly the outside option payo⁄ of 0.
Formally, p￿
i ￿ a(1 ￿ p￿



































which shows that there are additional customers crowded-in by the combined
e⁄ect of social ties and competition (￿ ￿ ￿r
d(1+b)
b(1+a) ￿ 0). Clearly, the size
of this additional e⁄ect depends on network density d. In particular, com-
petition does not improve market performance in the absence of social ties
(i.e., k￿TIES = k￿MON for d = 0); and the number of sophisticated custom-
ers crowded in is increasing in network density (@￿=@d > 0). It is most
important to note that the share of additional sophisticated customers also
increases with the number of reciprocal customers r (@￿=@r > 0 for d > 0):
This means that reciprocal customers generate a more pronounced external-
ity in the market if ￿rms compete and customers have social ties among each
other. This is because they crowd-in more sophisticated customers. Finally,
it should also be noted that social ties and reciprocity interact. In particular,
social ties reinforce the direct e⁄ect of reciprocal customers (@2￿=@d@r > 0).
19In Section 3.1, we have seen that the share of sophisticated customers in
non-degenerate cases (0 < k￿MON < s) increases with ￿, and falls with b. The
same, of course, is true for k￿TIES: The ￿rms￿temptation to cheat customers
reduces the additional share (@￿=@b < 0). And the share of additional
sophisticated customers crowded-in is higher if the cost of obtaining poor
quality for customers is lower (@￿=@a < 0).
4 Concluding remarks
The analysis above shows that reciprocity may mitigate market failure in
markets for experience goods. The e⁄ect is more pronounced when there
is competition between ￿rms and social ties among consumers. Then ￿rms
compete for reciprocal consumers because they might become repeat custom-
ers. Sophisticated consumers bene￿t from the presence of reciprocals: they
can free-ride on their presence.
Our paper illustrates that competition alone is not always the sole answer.
On the contrary, as long as consumers do not exchange information we have
seen that moving from a monopoly to a duopoly market e¢ ciency remains at
exactly the same level. But competition in the presence of social ties does the
trick. The duopoly market functions much better when there is an underlying
social network in which consumers are embedded. For competition to work
really well, some social cohesion is required.
One ￿nal remark seems in order. The literature on ￿social capital￿dis-
cusses potential economic and social e⁄ects of trust, social norms and social
ties (e.g., Putnam 2000). We believe our analysis contributes to this debate.
We show that potential market failure cannot only be alleviated by mech-
anisms devised by ￿rms (such as branding) but also by social capital. We
model an example of how social capital based on reciprocity and social ties
can substitute for missing or expensive legal structures, facilitating transac-
tions and reducing transaction costs (Arrow 1972). As a consequence, our
model helps to explain why in communities with dense social networks fewer
20regulations and mechanisms devised by ￿rms are observed.
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